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This paper simulates the minimum capital requirements for the wholesale exposures of a 
medium-sized bank in each EMU country depending on the credit rating agencies chosen by 
the bank to risk-weight its exposures in the standardised approach to credit risk in Basel II. 
Three main results emerge from the analysis. First, although the use of different combinations 
of credit rating agencies leads to significant differences in minimum capital requirements, 
these differences never exceed 10% of EMU banks’ regulatory capital for wholesale 
exposures on average. Second, the standardised approach provides a small regulatory capital 
incentive for banks to use several credit rating agencies to risk-weight their exposures. Third, 
the minimum capital requirements for the wholesale exposures of EMU banks will be higher 
in Basel II than in Basel I. I also show that the incentive for banks to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage in the standardised approach to credit risk is limited. 
 
 
Keywords: New Basel Capital Accord, capital requirements, credit rating agencies 
 




This paper focuses on the standardised approach to credit risk in Basel II, the new 
framework for banks’ regulatory capital adopted by G-10 countries. Numerous studies 
have recently analysed the internal ratings based approach to credit risk, which will be 
implemented by large banks at the end of 2006. On the other hand, the standardised 
approach has received little research attention even though evidence indicates that it will 
be adopted by 30% of European banks, mostly active in the retail, securities and 
cooperative sectors. The standardised approach relies on credit ratings of borrowers 
assigned by “external credit assessment institutions” (ECAIs) to compute banks’ 
regulatory capital for credit risk. While the recognition and validation of a particular 
ECAI’s assessments are the responsibility of national supervisors, the choice of the 
identity and number of ECAIs that banks work with is left to their discretion. This 
study investigates whether this discretion may create differences in capital requirements 
depending on the ECAI (or combination of ECAIs) chosen by banks to risk-weight their 
exposures. The use of different ECAIs may lead to differences in capital requirements for 
two reasons: (1) credit ratings are a subjective assessment of a counterparty’s probability 
of default and as such differ across ECAIs because of differences in opinion, 
methodology, rating scale etc. Differences in credit ratings are likely to create differences 
in regulatory risk-weights, hence in capital requirements; (2) ECAIs do not have the 
same coverage across rating markets and across countries. Differences in coverage are 
likely to create differences in capital requirements because counterparties which are not 
rated by an ECAI are assigned a risk-weight by default in Basel II.  
The paper, which includes a summary of the points in Basel II that are related to the 
use of ECAIs by banks, is based on a sample consisting of 3,125 corporates, banks and 
sovereigns rated by Moody’s, S&P and/or Fitch. Summary statistics show that 
disagreements between these three credit rating agencies average 18% for corporates, 
15% for banks and 13% for sovereigns, once credit ratings are mapped into the 
regulatory risk-weights specified by the Basel Committee. In addition, disagreements 
between credit rating agencies are lopsided for corporates and for banks, meaning that 
one ECAI is systematically more conservative than its competitors. This evidence, which 
is robust over time, is consistent with the most recent academic work on disagreements 
between credit rating agencies. In order to investigate whether the choice of different 
ECAIs results in different capital requirements, I use a resampling method to generate 
5
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 517
August 2005 
random portfolios of loans to corporates, banks and sovereigns granted by EMU banks. 
The capital requirements attached to these portfolios are calculated both under Basel I 
and Basel II. The simulations are based on statistics reflecting the composition of EMU 
banks’ loan portfolio and the breakdown between their rated and unrated claims. In 
addition, the simulations also include assumptions about the average credit quality of 
EMU banks’ loan portfolios, the average maturity of their interbank exposures and the 
sectoral distribution of their corporate exposures.  
The results of the paper are as follows: first, although significant differences exist 
between the minimum capital requirements implied by the assessments of Moody’s, S&P 
and/or Fitch, these differences do not exceed 6% of the minimum capital requirements 
for loans to corporates, banks and sovereigns when assuming that banks lend to rated 
and unrated counterparties, and 10% when assuming that banks only lend to rated 
counterparties; second, the standardised approach to credit risk provides a small 
regulatory capital incentive for banks to use several ECAIs to risk-weight their 
exposures; third, the minimum capital requirements for corporate, interbank and 
sovereign claims will be higher in Basel II than in Basel I. These different results are 
considered to be reassuring for banking supervisors. 
Since the results mentioned above are based on the assumption that banks will not 
modify their lending policy following the introduction of Basel II, I also investigate a 
case in which banks choose to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage by lending only to 
counterparties that receive a favourable assessment from the ECAI they use to risk-
weight their exposures. I show that such a strategy does not allow banks to decrease 
capital requirements for wholesale (i.e. corporate, interbank and sovereign) exposures 
below their Basel I level.   
It is important to point out that this paper may underestimate differences in capital 
requirements because it is based on the assessments of the world’s three largest credit 
rating agencies. Several studies indeed show that smaller credit rating agencies, whose 
assessments will also be used in Basel II, tend to assign more favourable credit ratings 
than those issued by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. This paper also insists on the fact that 
using cumulative default rates of credit ratings instead of their letter equivalent to map 
rating categories into regulatory risk-weights may not be sufficient to eliminate 
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1  Introduction 
 
  In May 2003, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released its third - and 
final - consultative paper on the New Basel Capital Accord, which is meant to replace 
the 1988 capital adequacy framework by a more risk-sensitive approach. One year later, 
on June 26, 2004, central bank governors and the head of bank supervisory authorities 
from the G-10 countries endorsed the new framework commonly known as Basel II. 
Implementation of the new framework in member jurisdictions is expected at year-end 
2006, though some advanced approaches to risk measurement may only become available 
at year-end 2007. Formally, the New Basel Capital Accord consists of three mutually 
reinforcing pillars: pillar 1, which sets minimum capital requirements for credit, market 
and operational risks; pillar 2, which requires banks to assess their capital requirements 
in relation to their risk and supervisors to take action if risks are too high; pillar 3, 
which establishes core disclosure by banks in order to improve market discipline. This 
paper focuses on the first pillar of Basel II and more specifically on credit risk, the risk of 
loss due to default by a borrower. The Basel Committee has developed two approaches 
for calculating regulatory capital for credit risk, the so-called “standardised approach” 
and “internal ratings based approach” (hereafter IRB). The standardised approach uses 
external ratings such as those provided by “external credit assessment institutions”
2 
(hereafter ECAIs) to determine risk-weights for capital charges, whereas the IRB allows 
banks to develop their own internal ratings for risk-weighting purposes subject to the 
meeting of specific criteria and supervisory approval. While large internationally active 
banks should opt for the IRB, the vast majority of small and medium-sized credit 
institutions from the G-10 are expected to adopt the simpler standardised approach (see 
for instance Basel Committee [2003a] and [2003b]). Outside the G-10, the standardised 
approach will also be the one preferred by most banks moving to Basel II given their 
accounting and information (e.g. lack of data) weaknesses.
3    
  The increased role given to credit rating agencies in the standardised approach to 
credit risk has led to many reactions from national supervisors and academic researchers. 
On the supervisory side, many studies and enquiries into the work and functioning of 
                                                           
2 The term “external credit assessment institutions” refers to credit rating agencies and export 
credit agencies. Since this study only deals with the assessments provided by the former, the 
terms “ECAIs” and “credit rating agencies” are used interchangeably throughout the paper. 
3 Some developing countries like China and India have already announced that they will not 
adopt the Basel II framework (The Economist, 2003). 
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credit rating agencies have been launched with the aim of better understanding the 
credit rating industry and making policy recommendations to reform it (e.g. Basel 
Committee [2000] and Securities and Exchange Commission [2003]). On the academic 
side, many studies have pointed to some potential dangers of linking regulatory risk-
weights to credit ratings, including a greater procyclicality of capital requirements 
(Amato and Furfine, 2003) and a greater volatility of capital requirements for banks 
located in developing countries (Ferri et al., 2001).  
  In spite of this growing interest for credit rating agencies, one issue related to the 
standardised approach has received little attention from academic researchers so far, 
namely the impact of the choice of different rating agencies on banks’ regulatory capital. 
Indeed, while the New Basel Accord makes national supervisors responsible for 
determining whether the assessments of a particular ECAI can be used for risk-weighting 
purposes, it allows banks to choose the ECAI(s) they want to work with among those 
validated by their supervisor. This discretion left to banks regarding the choice of 
external credit assessment institutions has raised some concerns among market 
participants and even among credit rating agencies. For instance, Duff & Phelps Credit 
Rating Co. (DCR), the third largest US credit rating agency before its merger with Fitch 
Ratings in 2001, pointed out that “important decisions need to be made about the 
number of external ratings banks should be required to use. DCR believes at least two 
ratings should be used to ensure a higher degree of transparency and to reduce 
unwarranted reliance on a single, perhaps more favourable, rating” (RiskWorld, 2000).
4 
Aside from generating differences in capital requirements, significant differences in 
external ratings - or combinations of external ratings - could also affect banks’ lending 
policies (through regulatory capital arbitrage) and hence the quality and efficiency of 
credit allocation as well as risk monitoring.   
  Therefore, a contribution of this paper is to provide evidence about disagreements 
between credit rating agencies and their impact on capital requirement differences. More 
precisely, this study simulates the capital requirements for the wholesale (i.e. corporate, 
interbank and sovereign) exposures of a representative bank in each EMU country both 
under the current and the New Basel Accord. In the latter case, I focus on the 
standardised approach by using the ratings assigned by the world’s three largest credit 
rating agencies: Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s), Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and 
Fitch Ratings (Fitch). Several results emerge from the analysis. First, although 
                                                           
4 Admittedly, this remark may also have been motivated by a conflict of interest.  
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significant differences exist between the minimum capital requirements generated by 
different combinations of ECAIs, the difference between the least and the most 
favourable combinations never exceeds 10% of banks’ regulatory capital for loans to 
corporates, banks and sovereigns on average in the EMU. Second, banks have a small 
regulatory capital incentive to work with several ECAIs to risk-weight their exposures. 
Third, the minimum capital requirements for loans to corporates, banks and sovereigns 
will be higher in Basel II than in Basel I. Since these conclusions are reached ceteris 
paribus, I also investigate the case where banks choose to modify their lending policy 
following the implementation of Basel II. More precisely, I examine whether the 
discretion left to banks regarding the choice of their ECAI(s) may give rise to 
“regulatory capital arbitrage”, a practice whereby banks choose to tailor their lending 
policy to lower their capital requirements. I find that the regulatory capital incentive to 
engage in capital arbitrage in Basel II is small. 
It should be pointed out that this paper focuses on bank assets whose risk-weights 
are determined by ECAIs’ assessments. This means that my simulations compute capital 
requirements for corporate, interbank and sovereign claims, but not for other types of 
assets (e.g. retail, SME or securitised assets). Since the “Third Quantitative Impact 
Study” (QIS 3) conducted by the Basel Committee (2003a and 2003b) shows precisely 
that the retail portfolio of banks is the area of activity where their capital requirements 
will be most affected under the standardised approach, this study only gives an imperfect 
idea of how capital requirements will change between Basel I and Basel II. Also, I rely on 
QIS 3 to support some of my hypotheses and results throughout the paper.
5 Caution is 
obviously needed when comparing the results of this study and QIS 3 since they are 
based on different groups of institutions (i.e. EMU vs. G-10 banks) and different 
estimation techniques (i.e. simulations vs. aggregation of bank individual results). 
Nonetheless, I believe that these comparisons are interesting because they provide a 
benchmark against which my assumptions and findings can be assessed.   
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the 
standardised approach to credit risk in Basel II and reviews the literature dealing with 
disagreements between credit rating agencies. The sample and the methodology used in 
this study are described in section 3. Section 4 reports the results, while section 5 
                                                           
5 More precisely, I use QIS 3 results for “Group 2” (i.e. small and medium-sized) banks since this 
group of institutions is more likely to adopt the standardised approach (Basel Committee, 2003a). 
However, some “Group 2” banks may also use the IRB (foundation) approach.  
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concludes and presents some policy implications of the findings for the implementation of 
the standardised approach to credit risk.     
 
 
2  The standardised approach to credit risk in Basel II and 
review of the literature  
 
2.1 The standardised approach to credit risk in Basel II 
 
It is now certain that the standardised approach will be adopted by a large number 
of banks, not necessarily located in low-income countries. According to a survey of 294 
financial institutions from 38 countries conducted in late 2003, 35% of total respondents 
(30% of European respondents) planned to opt for this simpler approach to credit risk 
(KPMG, 2004). Compared to previous years, these percentages were much higher 
because banks appear to have realised the significant level of effort required to comply 
with the IRB. Moreover, the uncertainty surrounding regulators’ approach to capital 
relief is forcing some banks to reconsider their decision to adopt the advanced 
approaches to credit risk. The banks which will most likely adopt the standardised 
approach in Europe are non-quoted banks, some quoted banks and the vast majority of 
banks belonging to the mutual sector (Credit Suisse, 2003).  
The minimum capital requirements for credit risk in Basel I and Basel II are set 





RW A = RWA × ∑                                                            (1) 
RWA 0.08 = RC ×                                                    (2)  
 
where: RWi = risk-weight attached to asset “i”  Ai = asset “i” (i = 1,...n) 
  RWA = risk-weighted assets  RC = regulatory capital 
 
As shown in formula (2), the minimum amount of regulatory capital that a bank 
must hold for credit risk is equal to 8% of its risk-weighted assets. The key difference 
between Basel I and the standardised approach to credit risk in Basel II is the choice of 
the risk-weights (RWi) in formula (1). While Basel I only recognises a simple 
10
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 517
August 2005OECD/non-OECD distinction to set risk-weights for corporate, interbank and sovereign 
claims, the standardised approach aims at providing a greater sensitivity to credit risk 
by linking risk-weights to the assessments provided by ECAIs. Table 1 shows the risk-
weighting scheme put forward by the Basel Committee, whereas Table 2 presents a 
comparison of rating scales across agencies and an interpretation of the core rating 
categories. The latter table is helpful since the rating notation used by the Basel 
Committee (2004) follows the conventions of one particular agency, S&P. In the new 
framework, rated corporate claims will be assigned to one of four risk buckets (20%, 
50%, 100% and 150%) depending on their external rating as opposed to only one bucket 
(100%) currently, while unrated corporate claims will retain the same risk-weight as in 
the current capital adequacy framework (100%). Regarding interbank claims, national 
supervisors will have the choice between two options (Option 1 and Option 2). Under 
Option 1, rated interbank claims will receive a risk-weight one category below that 
assigned to claims on their sovereign of incorporation. Under Option 2, rated interbank 
claims will receive a risk-weight based on their own external rating, with short-term (i.e., 
less than three-month maturity) claims generally attracting lower capital charges than 
long-term claims. The risk-weight for unrated interbank claims will also depend on the 
option chosen by national supervisors. Note that no unrated claim on a corporate or a 
bank may receive a risk-weight lower than the one applied to claims on its sovereign of 
incorporation. Finally, claims on sovereigns will be classified into five risk categories 
(ranging from 0% to 150%) compared to only two (0% and 100%) in the current 
framework. Thus, the standardised approach in Basel II yields capital charges which are 
indeed more sensitive to credit risk than the current capital requirements. Although the 
accuracy of the new risk-weighting scheme has been questioned by numerous studies,
6 it 
is now certain that banks adopting the standardised approach will be required to 
implement it by year-end 2006.  
Regarding the eligibility and the recognition process of external credit assessments, 
the Basel Committee requires national supervisors to determine whether the assessments 
of a particular ECAI can be used for the purpose of determining minimum capital levels 
in their jurisdiction. In order to ease the work of the national supervisors, the Basel 
Committee (2004, p. 23) has established a list of six criteria to be satisfied by external
                                                           
6 Most notably by Altman and Saunders (2001) and Altman et al. (2002), who use data on US 
bond ratings, defaults and loss rates. The second paper finds that the standardised approach 
overestimates the relative riskiness of high quality relative to low quality debt.  
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credit assessment institutions: objectivity, independence, international access/ 
transparency, disclosure, resources and credibility (these six criteria are in fact similar to 
those used by the US Securities and Exchange Commission to designate “nationally 
recognized statistical rating organizations”). At this stage, Moody’s, S&P and Fitch are 
the only credit rating agencies to have been granted the ECAI designation by the 
national authorities of all member countries of the Basel Committee. In addition, 
national supervisors will also be responsible for mapping the credit ratings of smaller 
ECAIs into the regulatory risk-weights available under the standardised approach by 
comparing the long-run average cumulative default rates (CDRs) of their assessments to 
long-run “reference” CDRs.
7 An ECAI whose CDRs start exceeding a “trigger” level 
above the “reference” CDRs could potentially lose its eligibility (Basel Committee [2004], 
Annex 2). 
Once national supervisors have decided which ECAIs’ assessments may be used in 
their jurisdiction, banks are allowed to choose both the identity and the number of 
eligible ECAIs they want to work with. Conditional on supervisory approval, banks may 
even decide to disregard ECAIs’ assessments and risk-weight all their corporate 
exposures at 100% (Basel Committee [2004], p.19). This offers the possibility for banks 
to stay under the current capital adequacy framework as far as corporate claims are 
concerned (cf. Table 1). The only constraints for banks applying the standardised 
approach to credit risk is that they must disclose which ECAIs they use and that they 
must use their ratings consistently. This provision means that banks are not allowed to 
“cherry pick” among the assessments of different ECAIs with the purpose of lowering 
their capital requirements. In order to prevent banks from doing so, the Basel 
Committee has developed a series of guidelines on “multiple assessments” to be applied 
by banks working with several external credit assessment institutions. These guidelines 
(Basel Committee [2004], p.24) state that a bank working with two ECAIs whose 
assessments map into different risk-weights must use the higher risk-weight. When the 
bank works with three or more ECAIs whose assessments lead to different risk-weights, 
the guidelines require the bank to use the higher of the two lowest risk-weights. Note 
that these guidelines seem to imply that banks have no reason to move from one to two 
ECAIs as it may only increase or leave unchanged the risk-weight attached to their 
claims. However, this reasoning fails to take into account that banks may able to reduce 
                                                           
7 The long-run “reference” CDRs are a twenty-year average of Moody’s and S&P three-year 
CDRs. Fitch is not considered in this average because its rating history only goes back to 1990. 
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the number of their unrated counterparties by working with two ECAIs. Since credit 
ratings generally map into risk-weights lower than the ones assigned to unrated 
counterparties, banks may thus have an incentive to go from one to two ECAIs.  
An implicit assumption behind Basel II is that the main credit rating agencies, whose 
assessments are used to construct long-run “reference” CDRs, are unbiased and have 
equivalent rating scales. However, the existing literature shows that these credit rating 
agencies have conflicting views on their clients’ creditworthiness. Together with the rule 
which sets capital charges for unrated claims, this well-established fact raises a number 
of questions for the design and the implementation of the standardised approach to 
credit risk. Does the choice of different ECAIs result in different capital requirements 
and if so, by how much do they differ? Do banks have any incentive to work with 
ECAIs’ assessments or are they better off treating their corporate claims as unrated? Is 
there an “optimal” choice of ECAIs, which delivers the lowest capital requirements? In 
order to illustrate the importance of the choice of ECAIs for banks’ regulatory capital, 
the next subsection summarises a series of studies which document the existence of 
disagreements between credit rating agencies. 
 
2.2 Review of the literature  
 
The literature which is relevant in the context of this study is concerned with how 
and why credit ratings attached to the same issue (or issuer) differ from one agency to 
another. This subsection reviews some of the most important contributions to this field 
of research and relates them to the analysis presented in the paper.  
A first strand of the literature analyses rating differences in relation to mostly 
quantitative variables. Ederington (1986) examines the ratings assigned by Moody’s and 
S&P to the industrial bonds newly issued between 1975 and 1980 and finds that the two 
rating agencies disagree in approximately 13% of the cases. He concludes that split 
ratings do not result from differences in rating standards or weights attached to rating 
determinants, but rather that they represent random differences of opinion. In contrast 
to these results, Beattie and Searle (1992) find that differences in ratings are mainly due 
to methodological differences between credit rating agencies. Beattie and Searle use data 
from the Financial Times Credit Ratings to compare pairs of rating agencies and report 
an overall disagreement rate of 56%, with the gap between two ratings for the same 
issuer exceeding one notch in 20% of the cases (one notch is the difference between two 
13
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adjacent rating categories, e.g. between AA- and A+). The study by Cantor and Packer 
(1995) focuses on credit ratings assigned by Moody’s and S&P and reports a lower 
disagreement rate for sovereigns (47%) than for corporates (60%). However, differences 
of opinion for lower credit ratings appear to be greater for sovereigns than for corporates, 
a phenomenon that can be explained by the greater uncertainty in the measurement of 
sovereign credit risk.   
A second set of papers shows that disagreements between credit rating agencies may 
also be linked to qualitative variables such as the issue date of ratings, or the industry 
and the nationality of the rated entity. Santos (2003) uses a sample of bonds issued by 
US non-financial firms between 1982 and 2002 and shows that recessions slightly increase 
the likelihood of mid-credit quality issuers obtaining a rating split. The intuition behind 
this result is straightforward: recessions are more likely to bring new uncertainties and 
information frictions, thereby increasing the likelihood of having different rating 
assessments. Morgan (2002) provides evidence that bond raters disagree more over banks 
and insurance companies than other sectors using a sample of almost 8,000 US bonds 
issued between 1983 and 1993. Moody’s and S&P disagree on 63% of bank issues and 
81% of insurance issues, with the gap between the two ratings exceeding one notch in 
18% of the cases for banks and 37% of the cases for insurance companies. Splits among 
raters also tend to be lopsided irrespective of the sector considered, i.e. one rating agency 
(Moody’s) tends to be more conservative than the other (S&P). However, Morgan shows 
that splits are relatively more lopsided in the banking industry, where the opacity of 
bank assets makes the conservative rater err even more on the safe side. Regarding the 
impact of the nationality of an issuer on its rating, many studies indicate that rating 
agencies suffer from a home country bias, i.e. they systematically assign higher ratings to 
firms located in their home country. For instance, a paper by Shin and Moore (2003) 
provides evidence that split ratings between US and Japanese credit agencies are 
relatively common, with Moody’s and S&P being more conservative than Japanese 
agencies for more than 70% of the Japanese firms in their sample. Shin and Moore do 
not find that these lopsided splits can be explained by special corporate governance 
features of Japanese firms that would be ignored by US rating agencies. Rather, they 
conclude that this phenomenon is consistent with the home country bias from which 
Moody’s and S&P are generally perceived to suffer (see for instance Fight, 2000).  
One alternative explanation for the observed differences in credit ratings is that firms 
may self-select into the rating process, i.e. firms may only request an additional rating 
14
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when they expect an improvement on their existing rating (a practice commonly referred 
to as “rating shopping”). This hypothesis is tested by Cantor and Packer (1997) using 
corporate issuer ratings published by five US agencies. Since they cannot reject the 
hypothesis that there is no selection bias, they conclude that rating differences are 
mainly attributable to non-identical rating scales across agencies. Tabakis and Vinci 
(2002) provide a formal test of this assertion by comparing a sample of bank ratings 
assigned by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. They find that, if the credit ratings assigned by 
S&P are lower than those assigned by Moody’s and Fitch, the default rates associated 
with the ratings of the three agencies are equivalent. This implies that credit rating 
differences are mainly due to differences in rating scales and not to differences of opinion, 
with historical default rates naturally “correcting” rating differences. However, this 
finding should be considered with care since the study in question suffers from two 
weaknesses. First, the authors use the default rates attached to corporate and not to 
bank ratings in their statistical tests, while several sources (e.g. Basel Committee, 2000) 
suggest that default rates of banks and non-banks differ significantly. Second, Tabakis 
and Vinci focus on a small sample of banks which are all rated investment grade. Since a 
well-known feature of default rates is to be very low for investment grade companies and 
to rise exponentially for speculative grade companies, this increases the likelihood of 
their tests not to reject the hypothesis that default rates are equal across agencies.                  
Overall, the literature reviewed in this subsection suggests that disagreements 
between credit rating agencies are quite prevalent and depend on several quantitative 
and qualitative variables. However, in the context of this study, which factors explain 
raters’ disagreements is less important than the very existence of disagreements. Indeed, 
the aim of this paper is not to investigate the causes of raters’ disagreements but rather 
to evaluate their consequences on capital requirements. As mentioned earlier, this 
question has not yet attracted the attention of researchers, although Tabakis and Vinci 
(2002) acknowledge that differences in assessments may cause differences in capital 
requirements and attempt therefore to produce a single benchmark rating that 
aggregates several individual ratings. The next section presents the data set and the 
methodology that I used to simulate the amount of regulatory capital that EMU banks 
must hold depending on which credit assessment(s) they choose to risk-weight their 
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3  Rating data and methodology 
 
3.1 Rating data 
 
The rating data used in this study consist of long-term issuer ratings assigned to 
corporates, banks and sovereigns by Moody’s, S&P and/or Fitch as of June 2002. Credit 
ratings and the corresponding financial information were obtained from Osiris and 
Bankscope, a database of companies and a database of banks, respectively. Issuer 
ratings, which are not specific to any particular debt issue, provide a comprehensive 
summary of the ratings of a counterparty by expressing an opinion of its ability to meet 
its senior financial obligations. However, it should be noted that Basel II explicitly 
recommends the use of issue - and not issuer - ratings for the purpose of risk-weighting 
claims.
8 My choice to work with issuer ratings is essentially dictated by their availability 
through electronic sources and by the fact that collecting a consistent data set of issue 
ratings is difficult since firms often receive different ratings for different types of debt 
issues. Moreover, several studies (e.g. Sironi, 2000) show that issue and issuer ratings are 
highly correlated even though credit rating agencies tend to rate subordinated issues one 
or two notches below the corresponding issuer senior debt rating. 
Table 3 shows that there are 3,125 issuers (2,048 corporates, 972 banks and 105 
sovereigns) rated by Moody’s, S&P, and/or Fitch in the sample and that the total 
number of credit ratings is 5,036 meaning that each issuer is rated by 1.6 rating agency 
on average. The table presents information regarding the size and coverage of the three 
credit rating agencies which suggests some interesting differences across rating markets 
(i.e. corporates, banks and sovereigns). For instance, in the corporate rating market, 
S&P rates 1,818 issuers, twice as much as Moody’s (940) and almost four times as much 
as Fitch (461). In the bank rating market, S&P and Fitch assign roughly the same 
number of issuer ratings (571 and 599, respectively) well above Moody’s (386). However, 
S&P covers a higher share of US and Asian banks, while Fitch specialises in rating 
European, Latin American and African banks. In the sovereign rating market, Moody’s 
has a small lead on S&P and Fitch due to its higher coverage of Asian, Latin American 
and African countries. Table 3 also shows that most corporate and bank credit ratings 
are assigned in North America and in Europe. More precisely, the US and Canada 
                                                           
8 Basel II allows the use of issuer credit ratings by banks when the borrower has no specific 
assessment available for an issued debt (see Basel Committee [2004], pp. 24-25).    
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together have 1,396 rated corporates (68.2% of all rated corporates) and 207 rated banks 
(21.3% of all rated banks), while EMU and non-EMU countries together have 354 rated 
corporates (17.3% of all rated corporates) and 457 rated banks (47% of all rated banks). 
Although these figures are consistent with the evidence found in credit rating agencies’ 
publications,
9 it is important to bear in mind that that the number of European 
corporates on which my simulations are based is small. In particular, the number of 
EMU corporates is only 163 meaning that the rated share of the corporate loan portfolio 
of EMU banks mainly consists of claims on a relatively low number of issuers (cf.   
   
section 4).       
Panels A and B of Table 4 show summary statistics about the impact of raters’ 
disagreement on regulatory risk-weight differences. The ratings assigned by Moody’s, 
S&P and Fitch to corporates, banks and sovereigns have been mapped into the different 
risk-weights chosen by the Basel Committee (cf. Table 1).
10 Panel A presents statistics 
for jointly rated counterparties, whereas Panel B presents statistics for counterparties 
rated by at least one rating agency. Both panels compare the risk-weights generated by 
the credit ratings of two agencies (i.e., Moody’s/S&P, Moody’s/Fitch and S&P/Fitch) 
and indicate whether these risk-weights are identical, lower or higher. As shown in Panel 
A, the regulatory risk-weights implied by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch ratings differ on 
average in 18% of the cases for corporates. Moreover, the risk-weights derived from 
Moody’s ratings are higher or equal than the risk-weights derived from S&P and Fitch 
ratings in 95.8% and 97.1% of the cases, respectively. In other words, raters’ 
disagreements are lopsided for corporates, with the ratings assigned by one agency 
(Moody’s) almost always leading to higher or equal regulatory risk-weights. Turning to 
jointly rated banks, one can observe roughly the same percentage of disagreements 
between raters, with S&P ratings now leading to equal or higher risk-weights than 
Moody’s and Fitch ratings in the vast majority of cases. Indeed, Moody’s classifies only 
four banks and Fitch only one into a higher risk bucket than S&P. The statistics at the 
bottom of Panel A show a higher rate of agreement for risk-weights attached to 
sovereigns, with no particular credit rating agency being more conservative than its 
competitors. Finally, it is important to mention that splits among raters occur mostly 
                                                           
9 Moody’s (2002) and Fitch (2004) indicate that the number of rated banks in the world is 
slightly above 1,200 while the number of rated corporates is about 2,500 in the US and 600 in 
Europe. These figures are higher than those presented in this paper since they refer to issue — not 
issuer — ratings. Nevertheless, they confirm that the number of rated US corporates is roughly 
four times higher than the number of rated European corporates. 
10 Option 2 for long-term claims was used to convert bank ratings into regulatory risk-weights. 
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between the 100% — 150% risk categories for corporates and between the 20% — 50% risk 
categories for banks, i.e., credit rating agencies disagree mostly on adjacent risk-weight 
classes.  
The figures presented in Panel A of Table 4 could be interpreted as evidence that 
banks wishing to minimise their regulatory capital should disregard Moody’s to risk-
weight their corporate claims and S&P to risk-weight their interbank claims, i.e. that 
banks should work only with Fitch’s assessments. However, as shown in Table 3, Fitch’s 
coverage of corporates is low. This means that banks relying solely on Fitch assessments 
would have to treat a lot of their corporate exposures as unrated (i.e., apply a 100% risk-
weight) and that they would not be able to use the risk-weight — potentially more 
favourable — implied by Moody’s or S&P ratings. In order to see whether the above 
analysis is modified when taking into account unrated claims, Panel B of Table 4 looks 
at counterparties rated by at least one credit rating agency. When a counterparty is not 
rated by an agency, it receives the risk-weight for unrated claims by default, i.e., 100% 
in the case of a corporate or a sovereign and 50% in the case of a bank (cf. Table 1). 
Although Fitch ratings now lead to more conservative risk-weights for banks than S&P 
ratings, the results in Panel B show, as in Panel A, a high rate of disagreement between 
credit rating agencies and lopsided risk-weight splits. More precisely, regulatory risk-
weights differ on average for 43% of the corporates, 34% of the banks and 22% of the 
sovereigns. Moody’s ratings lead to higher risk-weights for corporates in as much as 43% 
of the cases, while Fitch ratings lead to higher risk-weights for banks in up to 23% of the 
cases. As in Panel A, splits mostly occur on adjacent regulatory risk-weight classes. 
The main conclusion of Table 4 is that, in spite of the “rating scale compression” 
introduced by the Basel Committee, differences of opinion and/or differences of coverage 
among raters are likely to have an impact on regulatory risk-weight differences. The 
evidence presented in Table 4, though based on risk-weight splits and not on rating 
splits, is also broadly consistent with the literature reviewed earlier: credit rating 
agencies disagree more on corporates and banks than on sovereigns and splits among 
raters are not normally distributed. However, contrary to Morgan (2002), I do not find 
that rating agencies disagree more on banks than on corporates.
11 Finally, it is also 
important to mention that time-series evidence from Osiris and Bankscope indicates that 
the size and the direction of the risk-weight splits were relatively constant between 1996 
                                                           
11 I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  b e a r  i n  m i n d  t h a t  M o r g a n  ( 2 0 0 2 )  f o c u s e s  o n  U S  b o n d  r a t i n g s  a s s i g n e d  
between 1983 and 1993 hence his results are not necessarily comparable with mine. 
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and 2004 (cf. Appendix 1). Thus, the relatively high rates of disagreement for corporates 
and banks do not seem to be the result of the uncertainty that may have surrounded 
June 2002.  
While Table 4 clearly shows that differences in external ratings could lead to 
differences in capital requirements, it does not give an idea of the exact magnitude of 
these differences. Also, Table 4 does not tell us whether the choice of (say) one rating 
agency versus two or three would result in very different capital requirements via the 
guidelines on “multiple assessments”. Ultimately, the answer to these questions depends 
on the geographical and sectoral distributions as well as on the size of banks’ exposures. 
In the following subsection, I outline the main features of the Monte-Carlo simulations 




This paper conducts Monte-Carlo simulations by focusing on one bank in each EMU 
country, which has total assets amounting to € 10 billion and for which assets are drawn 
at random subject to its balance sheet characteristics satisfying the conditions specified 
below. A bank of that size exists in each EMU country and is generally classified as a 
medium-sized institution by national regulators, i.e. exactly the type of bank which is 
likely to adopt the standardised approach to credit risk.
12 The outcome of a simulation is 
the amount of regulatory capital (expressed as a percentage of total assets) that the 
bank must hold to comply with Basel I and the standardised approach to credit risk in 
Basel II. In the latter case, results are simulated for every possible combination of ECAIs 
that the bank may choose by following the guidelines on “multiple assessments” set by 
the Basel Committee (cf. section 2.1). Given that this study focuses on the assessments 
provided by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, the bank has seven possible choices of ECAIs: it 
can work with one credit rating agency (Moody’s, S&P or Fitch), two credit rating 
agencies (Moody’s/S&P, Moody’s/Fitch or S&P/Fitch) or all three credit rating 
agencies. The simulation is repeated 10,000 times and the frequency distributions of 
capital adequacy ratios give an estimate of the relevant capital adequacy distributions. 
From these distributions, I select the 50
th percentile as well as the maximum and the 
minimum values attained by the capital adequacy ratios.  
                                                           
12 It turns out that the choice of a particular bank size is irrelevant. Simulations for a bank 
having total assets amounting to € 25 billion or € 3 billion deliver essentially the same results.  
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The Monte-Carlo method is used in this study because of its lack of assumptions 
about the functional form of the distribution of capital requirements, which is generally 
non-normal given the multiple conditions imposed here below. However, it has a major 
weakness, namely that it rests on the implicit (and unrealistic) assumption that my 
database contains the whole universe of rated firms. Despite this shortcoming, the 
Monte-Carlo method is the preferred approach here, especially since numerous papers in 
the field of banking (e.g. Carey [1998] or Altman et al. [2002]) rely on it to estimate 
distributions of loss rates, a problem relatively similar to mine.    
In the simulations, the randomly drawn portfolios must satisfy a number of 
conditions otherwise they are rejected. First, the simulated portfolios must respect the 
geographical and sectoral distributions of bank assets in the country of origin of each 
bank. Table 5 shows the consolidated balance sheet of banks in each EMU country, 
which was obtained through the ECB statistical databank. The table breaks down bank 
assets into the following items: cash, loans (to non-financial firms, banks, sovereigns, 
other financial institutions, insurance companies and households), securities and money 
market fund shares/unit, holding of shares and other equities, fixed assets and remaining 
assets. In addition, the geographical distribution of loans to firms, banks and sovereigns 
is also given by broad area of the borrower (home country, European Monetary Union 
and rest of the world). From Table 5, it appears that the majority of claims on firms and 
sovereigns are domestic, whereas the interbank lending market is more international. On 
average, loans to firms amount to 20.7% of bank assets in the EMU, while interbank 
loans and sovereign loans account for 26.6% and 3.6%, respectively. Since the ECB 
statistical databank does not distinguish between loans to corporates and loans to SMEs, 
I assume that loans to corporates account for a minority (25%) of loans to domestic 
firms and a majority (75%) of loans to foreign firms.
13 For instance, in the case of 
Austria, 5.7% (=22.9% × 25%) of bank assets are assumed to consist of loans to 
domestic corporates, 1.1% (=1.5% × 75%) of loans to EMU corporates and 1.0% (=3.9% 
× 75%) of loans to corporates located in the rest of the world. The last column of     
Table 5 shows that bank assets whose risk-weights are determined by ECAIs’ 
assessments (i.e. wholesale exposures) represent 37.4% of total bank assets on average in 
the EMU. It is worth stressing that the figures in Table 5 are not specific to small and 
medium-sized banks. In fact, the distribution of bank assets in Table 5 more than 
                                                           
13 Masschelein (2003) and Saurina and Trucharte (2003) report that loans to corporates account 
for 20% and 29% of total loans to firms in Belgium and in Spain, respectively.   
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probably reflects the distribution of assets of large banks, i.e. the banks which will adopt 
the internal ratings based approach. To some extent, this problem is insurmountable as 
the ECB statistical database does not offer a breakdown of bank assets by bank size. 
Thus, one should interpret the results with caution until evidence on the composition of 
small and medium-sized banks’ loan portfolio is available. 
A second condition that the randomly drawn portfolios must satisfy is that their 
credit quality must correspond to the figures published by the Basel Committee (2003a 
and 2003b) in its third Quantitative Impact Study. According to the Committee, banks 
that participated in QIS 3 had 74.3% of their rated corporate claims and 95.7% of their 
rated interbank claims classified as investment grade.
14 These average figures are used in 
the simulations by considering that a claim belongs to the investment grade category if 
it is not rated speculative grade by any of the three credit rating agencies.  
A third condition that the selected portfolios must respect is that one-third of 
corporate exposures must be allocated to firms active in the following five sectors: 
agriculture and fishing; mining and quarrying; manufacturing; electricity, gas and water 
supply; construction.
15 I also impose that two-third of interbank claims have a maturity 
of less than three months,
16 an important assumption since short-term claims on banks 
receive a preferential treatment in Basel II (cf. Table 1). 
In the simulations, bank counterparties consist both of rated and unrated entities. 
The rated entities are randomly selected among the 3,125 corporates, banks and 
sovereigns rated by Moody’s, S&P and/or Fitch provided that the conditions mentioned 
above are respected. As Osiris and Bankscope only report the total amount of bank 
loans of each corporate and each bank, I divide these figures by the number of bank 
relationships that a corporate or a bank has according to its size.
17 The resulting figures, 
which can be seen as the average bank loans of each corporate or each bank, are used to 
fill the portfolio of each EMU bank randomly. In the case of loans to sovereigns, I 
assume a fixed loan amount of € 10 million. As a final condition in the simulations, a 
loan to a single (rated) corporate, bank or sovereign borrower cannot consume more than 
                                                           
14 These figures are for “Group 1” (i.e. large) banks since the figures for “Group 2” (i.e. small and 
medium) banks published by the Committee are inaccurate. 
15 This figure is based on the figures shown in the annual reports of major EMU banks. 
16 This figure is a rough average of the percentage of short-term interbank claims in Belgium 
(76%), Germany (53%) and Luxembourg (“more than 50%”) found in Degryse and Nguyen 
(2003), Upper and Worms (2002) and Banque Centrale du Luxembourg (2001), respectively. 
17 The number of bank relationships that a firm has according to its size is taken from a survey of 
European countries presented in Ongena and Smith (2000).     
21
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 517
August 2005 
5% of banks’ total regulatory capital. This requirement represents a reasonable 
constraint from the point of view of actual practice.  
Some of the results presented below also include counterparties which are not rated 
by Moody’s, S&P or Fitch. These results are obtained by drawing randomly portfolios 
with country-specific percentages of unrated counterparties. These percentages are based 
on the assumption that the distribution between rated and unrated claims of EMU 
banks corresponds to the breakdown obtained from Osiris and Bankscope. This 
breakdown is shown in Table 6. For example, the first row of Table 6 indicates that 
70.0% of total claims on Austrian corporates, 47.9% of total claims on EMU corporates 
(excluding Austrian ones) and 55.8% of total claims on corporates located outside the 
EMU are unrated (the figures for banks and sovereigns must be interpreted in the same 
way).
18 I n  t h i s  p a p e r ,  I  a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e s e  p e rcentages reflect the actual distribution 
between rated and unrated claims in the corporate loan portfolio of an Austrian bank, 
i.e. that 70.0% of the domestic corporate loan portfolio, 47.9% of the EMU corporate 
loan portfolio and 55.8% of the “rest of the world” corporate loan portfolio of an 
Austrian bank consist indeed of loans to unrated entities. 
The figures in Table 6 are not specific to small and medium-sized banks but they can 
be compared to the figures reported by “Group 2” banks in QIS 3. In order to perform 
this comparison, I multiply the percentages of loans to corporates, banks and sovereigns 
in Table 5 by their corresponding unrated share in Table 6 in order to obtain the 
percentages of corporate, interbank and sovereign claims which are unrated. The 
resulting figures, which are shown in the columns labelled “AVG” in Table 6, indicate 
for instance that 66.8% of the corporate loan portfolio, 24.6% of the interbank loan 
portfolio and 7.8% of the sovereign loan portfolio of an Austrian bank consist of loans to 
unrated counterparties. The last row of Table 6 shows that the EMU averages of the 
different country shares are 52.5%, 24.5% and 6.1%, respectively. These figures are 
slightly higher than the figures mentioned in QIS 3, with “Group 2” classifying 46% of 
their corporate claims, 3% of their interbank claims and only 1% of their sovereign 
claims in the unrated bucket. I interpret this as evidence that my results are likely to 
slightly underestimate differences in capital requirements between ECAIs since they are 
based on higher shares of unrated claims than those reported by banks which will 
probably adopt the standardised approach. 
                                                           
18 The identity of the banks that granted these loans is not disclosed in Osiris and Bankscope. 
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Eventually, it proved impossible to simulate portfolios respecting the different 
conditions imposed in this section for five EMU countries (Austria, Finland, Greece, 
Italy and Portugal) due to a lack of rated corporates and/or rated banks allowing 
building such portfolios. As a consequence, results are only presented for the remaining 
seven EMU countries for which I was able to simulate portfolios whose characteristics 
correspond to what was specified above.   
 
 
4 Results   
 
The results of the Monte-Carlo simulations are presented in Tables 7 to 9. First, in 
Table 7, I assume that a share of the banks’ portfolio is made up of loans to unrated 
counterparties, which corresponds to the present situation in the EMU (the results found 
in this table are based on the percentages of unrated corporates, banks and sovereigns 
shown in Table 6). Second, in Table 8, I assume that the totality of the banks’ portfolio 
is made up of loans to rated counterparties. Although this assumption does not represent 
the current situation of EMU banks, it may be interesting to consider this extreme case 
scenario since the number of rated issuers has increased dramatically in Europe over the 
last fifteen years.
19 This trend has been recently encouraged through the publication of 
recommendations intended to promote best practice and to improve the liquidity and 
credibility of European credit markets. These recommendations, published by a group of 
leading financial institutions, include the fact that issuers obtain at least two ratings 
from among the three principal agencies active in Europe, i.e. Moody’s, S&P and Fitch 
(UK Society of Investment Professionals, 2003). Third, in Table 9, I assume that banks 
work with S&P and choose to lend only to counterparties that receive a favourable risk-
weight from that ECAI. I call this situation “regulatory capital arbitrage”. 
The structure of Tables 7 to 9 is identical. For each country, I present the amount of 
regulatory capital (expressed as a percentage of total assets) that banks are required to 
hold for their corporate, interbank and sovereign loan portfolios under different risk-
weighting schemes, by considering the mean of the simulated distributions. The sum of 
capital requirements for these three portfolios then gives the total regulatory capital 
requirements that banks must satisfy. These requirements are relatively low (i.e. 
                                                           
19 For instance, the number of European companies rated by Moody’s has grown by more than 
35% each year since 1997 (Moody’s, 2003).  
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typically below 2%) because they do not incorporate capital charges for assets whose 
risk-weights are not determined by ECAIs’ assessments (e.g. retail, SME or securitised 
assets). Finally, since total capital requirements are calculated at the mean of the 
distribution, I also report the minimum and maximum values that they attain in the 
simulations.  
In order to find out whether the total capital requirements observed in Tables 7 to 9 
are significantly different across combinations of ECAIs, statistical tests on the mean of 
their distribution are carried out. In the tables, I report the cases where the tests fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that the distributions of total requirements have the same 
mean. For instance, in the case of France (Table 7), the statistical tests do not reject the 
null hypothesis that the distributions of total capital requirements have the same mean 
in two cases: (1) when comparing the distributions resulting from the choice of S&P 
versus Fitch; (2) when comparing the distributions resulting from the choice of S&P and 
Fitch together versus Moody’s, S&P and Fitch together. In all other cases, the statistical 
tests do reject the null hypothesis that the distributions of total capital requirements 
have the same mean.   
Regarding the weighting of interbank claims in Basel II, results are presented for the 
case in which risk-weights are determined by individual bank ratings (Option 2) and not 
by the rating of the sovereign of incorporation of the bank (Option 1).
20 In fact, the 
difference between the two options is relatively small and in some cases even not 
statistically significant, a result which echoes the findings of Ferri et al. (2001). The 
narrow difference between Options 1 and 2 is an interesting result given that some 
interested parties (e.g. Austrian Federal Economic Chamber, 2003) expressed their 
concerns that the two options could lead to distortions of competition between countries 
adopting one option over the other. In light of my results, these concerns seem to be 
largely unfounded. Given that the two options appear to be equally costly in terms of 
regulatory capital and that several studied have pointed out the inconsistencies of     
Option 1,
21 this paper therefore supports the use of Option 2 to risk-weight interbank 
claims in the EMU area. 
                                                           
20 The Basel Committee (2003a) mentions that seven G-10 countries have decided to implement 
Option 1 while the remaining six have decided to adopt Option 2. Obviously, it would have been 
better to respect the choice made by national supervisors in the simulations, but the Committee 
refuses to disclose the identity of “Option 1” and “Option 2” countries given the preliminary 
nature of the decision taken by G-10 members.  
21 For a summary of the arguments against the use of Option 1, see the comments issued by the 
Companhia Portuguesa de Rating (2003).  
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4.1 No regulatory capital arbitrage (Tables 7 and 8)   
 
This subsection focuses on Tables 7 and 8, which both assume that banks do not 
modify their lending policy following the implementation of Basel II. The results at the 
bottom of each table are for the EMU as a whole and are obtained by averaging country 
results. I first compare the results for the EMU as a whole with those shown in QIS 3 for 
the G-10 as a whole in order to see whether the simulations produce realistic figures. The 
QIS 3 results for “Group 2” banks adopting the standardised approach show that loans 
to corporates attract roughly the same capital requirements as loans to banks and that 
the capital requirements for loans to sovereigns are close to zero under the current 
capital adequacy framework. They further forecast a decrease of 10% in the capital 
requirements for loans to corporates, an increase of 15% in the capital requirements for 
loans to banks and almost no change in the capital requirements for loans to sovereigns 
between Basel I and Basel II. The EMU averages in Tables 7 and 8 are in line with these 
results even though this study and QIS 3 are based on different groups of banks (i.e., 
EMU versus G-10 banks). Indeed, the simulations show a decrease in EMU banks’ 
capital requirements for corporate loans, which can be attributed to the good quality of 
their corporate loan portfolio. As a consequence, it is very unlikely that EMU banks will 
use the Basel Committee’s provision allowing them to treat their corporate exposures as 
unrated. The simulations also point out an increase in EMU banks’ capital requirements 
for interbank loans, which is not surprising given that loans to OECD banks - the bulk 
of interbank loans in the EMU - received a very favourable treatment in Basel I. The 
simulated capital requirements for loans to sovereigns are unchanged between Basel I 
and Basel II. Thus, the simulations in Tables 7 and 8 appear to produce realistic results 
in light of QIS 3.  
  Hereunder, I present the main contribution of this paper, namely an analysis of the 
differences in capital requirements resulting from the choice of different ECAIs in Basel 
II. It is important to bear in mind that the results given in Table 7 provide a lower 
bound for these differences since they are based on the assumption that some bank 
counterparties are unrated whereas the results given in Table 8 provide an upper bound 
for the differences since they assume that all bank counterparties are rated. It is 
therefore not surprising that the figures in Table 7 reveal only modest differences 
between the total capital requirements resulting from the choice of different ECAIs. 
Turning to the average results for the EMU, the difference between the highest and the 
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lowest amount of total regulatory capital for loans to corporates, banks and sovereigns is 
equal to € 8 million in Basel II. Indeed, the choice of Moody’s alone yields a total 
amount of regulatory capital (expressed as a percentage of total assets) of 1.33 while the 
choice of all three credit rating agencies together yields a total amount of regulatory 
capital (expressed as a percentage of total assets) equal to 1.25.
22 This means that EMU 
banks can lower their capital charge for corporate, interbank and sovereign loans by a 
mere 6% on average if they choose to work with all three credit rating agencies together 
instead of working with Moody’s alone. If EMU banks choose to work with another 
combination of ECAIs, their regulatory capital relief will be even smaller. For instance, a 
bank adding the assessments of S&P to those of Moody’s only decreases its total amount 
of regulatory capital for loans to corporates, banks and sovereigns by € 4 million on 
average in the EMU. However, the results in Table 7 may underestimate the differences 
in capital requirements resulting from the choice of different ECAIs for two reasons at 
least: (1) these results are based on slightly higher shares of unrated claims than those 
reported by “Group 2” banks in QIS 3; (2) these results fail to capture the fact that the 
number of rated European issuers will certainly increase in the future.
23 The differences 
in capital requirements in Basel II may thus lie between the figures reported in Table 7 
and those shown in Table 8, the latter table being admittedly an extreme scenario which 
would not be expected to hold in the short to medium term. Nevertheless, it is important 
to point out that capital requirements are slightly lower in Table 8 than in Table 7 
meaning that banks have a small capital incentive to lend only to rated counterparties 
i.e. to move from the situation described in Table 7 to the situation depicted in Table 8.       
  The figures in Table 8 reveal slightly larger differences between ECAIs than those 
shown in Table 7. Looking at the average results for the EMU, the difference between 
the highest and the lowest amount of regulatory capital for loans to corporates, banks 
and sovereigns is now equal to € 12 million. In some countries, this difference is notably 
higher as it reaches € 19 million for Belgium, € 16 million for Luxembourg and € 20 
million for Spain. More generally, substantial differences in capital requirements exist 
between almost any combination of ECAIs. For instance, in the case of France, a bank 
choosing to risk-weight is portfolio of loans to corporates, banks and sovereigns with 
S&P instead of Moody’s saves € 10 million of regulatory capital.  
                                                           
22 Since the bank considered in this study has total assets amounting to € 10 billion, one 
percentage point (0.01) in the tables represents € 1 million in terms of regulatory capital. 
23 Fitch (2004) indicates for instance that even though only 600 European corporates are rated at 
the moment, another 1,000 may consider acquiring a rating in the coming years. 
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The above results demonstrate that the choice of different ECAIs in the standardised 
approach to credit risk could lead to some differences in capital requirements. The choice 
of the ECAI (or combination of ECAIs) delivering the lowest capital requirements may 
thus be of interest to banks. With respect to this matter, some results hold for every 
EMU country in Tables 7 and 8. A first result is that, when a bank works with only one 
credit rating agency, the choice of Moody’s generally leads to the highest total capital 
requirements. A second result is that, when a bank works with two credit rating 
agencies, any combination of ECAIs involving Moody’s always leads to higher total 
capital requirements than the choice of S&P and Fitch together. This result can be 
attributed to the higher capital requirements for loans to corporates and for loans to 
banks entailed by the choice of any combination of ECAIs involving Moody’s. As far as 
loans to corporates are concerned, these higher capital requirements mainly reflect the 
fact that Moody’s assigns tougher credit ratings to corporates than its competitors (cf. 
Table 4) whereas in the case of interbank loans, these higher capital requirements are 
mainly due to Moody’s relatively poor coverage of banks (cf. Table 3). A third important 
result is that banks benefit from a small decrease in regulatory capital when they choose 
to work with an additional credit rating agency i.e., capital requirements slightly 
decrease when banks work with a second credit rating agency and they are further 
lowered when the banks work with a third credit rating agency. It is worth stressing that 
this result is non-trivial, especially when considering the transition from one to two 
ECAIs. Indeed, as pointed out earlier, the guidelines on “multiple assessments” set by 
the Basel Committee seem to imply that banks have no reason to move from one to two 
ECAIs since it may only increase or leave unchanged the risk-weight attached to their 
claims. This reasoning fails to take into account that banks may also benefit from 
working with a second ECAI if it assigns lower risk-weights than the ones assigned by 
default to claims which are not rated by the first ECAI. In fact, Tables 7 and 8 show 
precisely that the regulatory capital benefit of having additional counterparties rated 
outweighs the cost of having some of them rated twice. This result is important because 
it suggests that banks will have a small regulatory capital incentive to use several 
assessments to risk-weight their exposures in the standardised approach to credit risk. If 
banks work with several ECAIs, the measurement of credit risk will be based on different 
opinions and will be more accurate than if it was based on one credit rating agency only 
or on a rigid rule, as in Basel I. The Basel Committee will then reach its main objective, 
i.e. that the risk measurement of banks should be improved thanks to Basel II.    
27
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 517
August 2005 
Finally, the results in Tables 7 and 8 also shed light on the differences between     
Basel I and Basel II and on the countries which may benefit from lower capital 
requirements in Basel II. When assuming that some bank counterparties are unrated 
(Table 7), total capital requirements increase between Basel I and Basel II in each EMU 
country irrespective of banks’ choice of ECAIs. When assuming that all bank 
counterparties are rated (Table 8), total capital requirements also increase though by a 
smaller amount. Total capital requirements may even decrease in Belgium and in Spain 
depending on banks’ choice of ECAIs. However, since Table 8 is based on the extreme 
assumption that banks only grant loans to rated counterparties, these results are not 
emphasized here. Overall, the evidence presented in the paper indicates that Basel II will 
increase the capital requirements for the corporate, interbank and sovereign loans of 
EMU banks adopting the standardised approach to credit risk irrespective of their 
lending policy toward (un)rated counterparties.
24 However, as said earlier, any global 
assessment of whether banks will benefit from a capital relief in Basel II should also take 
into account that capital requirements for claims whose risk-weight are not determined 
by ECAIs’ assessments will change compared to Basel I. The Third Quantitative Impact 
Study reports for instance that capital requirements for “Group 2” banks’ retail portfolio 
will decrease by 23% in the standardised approach to credit risk. Since retail activities of 
“Group 2” banks account for the largest share of their current capital requirements, the 
overall change in capital requirements may be close to zero as stated in the Committee’s 
objectives. 
From a regulatory perspective, the above results are relatively reassuring. First, the 
differences between the total capital requirements resulting from the choice of different 
ECAIs in Basel II — though statistically significant — never exceed 10% on average in the 
EMU. Second, banks have a small regulatory capital incentive to work with several 
ECAIs to risk-weight their exposures. Third, the total capital requirements for corporate, 
interbank and sovereign loans will be higher in Basel II than in Basel I, thereby making 
banks more resistant to adverse financial shocks. These results hold ceteris paribus, i.e. 
when assuming that banks do not modify their lending policy following the introduction 
of the new capital adequacy rules. However, the likely increase in total capital 
requirements may lead banks to alter their lending behaviour in order to distort the 
effects of Basel II. The consequences of banks engaging in such practices are investigated 
                                                           
24 Adding the new capital charge for operational risk to the capital charge for credit risk would 
only strengthen this conclusion. 
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in the next subsection. 
  
4.2 Regulatory capital arbitrage (Table 9)  
 
When capital adequacy rules oblige banks to maintain a capital cushion in excess of 
what they would otherwise choose, banks may start using different methods to make 
their capital ratio look artificially high relative to the riskiness of their exposures. This 
phenomenon is commonly referred to as “regulatory capital arbitrage”. There is evidence 
that the volume of regulatory capital arbitrage was large and growing rapidly after the 
implementation of Basel I, especially among the largest banks (Basel Committee, 1999). 
One of the oldest and most popular forms of regulatory capital arbitrage is known as 
“cherry-picking”. In the context of Basel I, cherry-picking is defined as the practice 
whereby banks shifted their portfolio’s composition toward lower quality credits within a 
particular risk-weight category, e.g. the 100% risk bucket. This subsection explores the 
possibility for banks to engage in an alternative form of cherry-picking in Basel II by 
shifting their portfolio’s composition toward counterparties which receive a favourable 
risk-weight from the ECAI(s) that they use to risk-weight their exposures. Since the 
standardised approach to credit risk offers the possibility to banks to choose their 
ECAI(s), banks may want to tailor their lending policy to exploit the differences of 
opinion that frequently arise between external credit assessment institutions.  
The most obvious way for banks to engage in cherry-picking is to choose to work 
with a given ECAI and to only grant loans to counterparties for which the ECAI’s 
assessments yield lower or equal risk-weights than the assessments of the other ECAIs. 
This strategy is illustrated in Table 9 by assuming that banks use S&P to risk-weight 
their exposures and only lend to counterparties for which S&P assessments lead to lower 
or equal risk-weights than the assessments of Moody’s and Fitch.
25 It should be stressed 
that the assumptions underlying Table 9 are quite extreme. First, I assume that the 
portfolio of banks consists only of loans to rated counterparties, like in Table 8. Second, I 
assume that banks only grant loans to entities that receive a “favourable” assessment 
from S&P, which reduces the number of rated counterparties to which banks can lend by 
23% compared to Tables 7 and 8. Third, I make the implicit assumption that differences 
between credit rating agencies remain constant though time, otherwise the viability of 
                                                           
25 S&P was chosen arbitrarily. The conclusions of this subsection are unaffected for other choices 
of ECAIs.  
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the strategy consisting in lending only to counterparties which had a favourable 
assessment from S&P in June 2002 is undermined.
26  
In spite of these quite extreme assumptions, the results in Table 9 are once more 
reassuring from a regulatory standpoint. Indeed, the capital requirements resulting from 
the choice of S&P alone are still higher than those in Basel I, though of course lower 
than those implied by any other combination of ECAIs in Basel II. I interpret this result 
as evidence that, even under quite extreme circumstances, capital arbitrage is unlikely to 
allow banks to decrease very strongly their capital charge for loans to corporates, banks 
and sovereigns.  
 
 
5  Conclusion and policy implications  
 
This paper focuses on the standardised approach to credit  risk  in  Basel  II.             
  
I investigate whether the choice of different external credit assessment institutions has 
an impact on EMU banks’ minimum capital requirements for loans to corporates, banks 
and sovereigns. This question deserves attention because numerous studies have shown 
that credit ratings differ substantially across rating agencies. In addition, differences in 
coverage between rating agencies may also create incentives for banks to adopt one 
ECAI (or combination of ECAIs) instead of another.  
 I find three main results. First, although significant differences exist between the 
minimum capital requirements implied by the assessments of Moody’s, S&P and/or 
Fitch, these differences do not exceed 6% of the minimum capital requirements for loans 
to corporates, banks and sovereigns when assuming that banks lend to rated and unrated 
counterparties, and 10% when assuming that banks only lend to rated counterparties. 
Thus, this result does not support the request made by some market participants to 
oblige banks to consider several assessments in order to avoid them relying “on a single, 
perhaps more favourable, rating” (RiskWorld, 2000). Second, the standardised approach 
to credit risk provides a small regulatory capital incentive for banks to use several 
ECAIs to risk-weight their exposures. As a consequence, the measurement of credit risk 
in Basel II is likely to improve compared to Basel I. Third, the minimum capital 
                                                           
26 The latter assumption is not necessarily unrealistic. NERA Economic Consulting (2003) 
provides evidence that credit rating agencies tend to change their ratings in the same direction 
though not necessarily at the same time. 
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requirements for corporate, interbank and sovereign loans will be higher in Basel II than 
in Basel I. However, the overall change in the minimum capital requirements of EMU 
banks may be close to zero or even negative since this paper abstains from simulating 
capital requirements for assets whose risk-weights are not determined by ECAIs’ 
assessments.  
The conclusions mentioned above may not hold anymore if banks choose to modify 
their lending policy following the introduction of the new capital adequacy rules. In order 
to investigate this possibility, I present an extreme case scenario in which banks choose 
to work with one particular ECAI in Basel II and only grant loans to counterparties 
which receive a favourable assessment from that ECAI. I show that such a strategy does 
not allow banks to lower capital requirements below their Basel I level. As a 
consequence, the incentive for banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage in the 
standardised approach to credit risk is believed to be limited.   
It is important to stress that the results of this paper probably underestimate the 
differences in capital requirements resulting from the choice of different ECAIs because 
they focus only on the assessments of the world’s three largest credit rating agencies. As 
mentioned earlier, several studies show that credit rating agencies tend to be more 
favourable to firms located in their home country. Hence differences in capital 
requirements may be larger in countries where banks actively use the assessments of 
these (often smaller) credit rating agencies in addition to those of the “Big Three”.
 This 
may be the case in Japan for example, where banks often rely on the ratings of two local 
agencies, Japan Credit Rating Agency and Rating and Investment Information Inc., 
which rate a majority of domestic firms between one and two notches higher than 
Moody’s and S&P (Shin and Moore, 2003). Similar differences are found when informally 
comparing the assessments of several credit rating agencies located in developing 
countries with those of Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. Thus, differences in capital 
requirements between ECAIs may be larger in the countries where the vast majority of 
banks are expected to adopt the standardised approach to credit risk.    
It should be noted that the Basel Committee’s proposal to use cumulative default 
rates of credit ratings instead of their letter equivalent to map rating categories into 
regulatory risk-weights may not eliminate differences in assessments between ECAIs. 
The reason is essentially that the long-run “reference” cumulative default rates (CDRs) 
set by the Committee for the mapping of rating categories into risk-weights are a 20-year 
average of Moody’s and S&P’s CDRs, with no other rating agency offering data over 
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such a long time period. As a consequence, the comparison of a rating agency’s long-run 
average CDRs with the long-run “reference” CDRs calculated by the Committee will 
necessarily be imperfect and the correspondence between different rating scales not 
guaranteed. Moreover, there does not appear to be a mechanism built into the New 
Basel Accord requiring long-run “reference” CDRs to be updated over time. This is a 
problem since Cantor and Falkenstein (2001) find that historical default rates are not 
constant over time. 
The statistics presented in this paper may also help to interpret some recent results 
for the internal ratings based approach, which show that internal credit ratings assigned 
by banks differ significantly. For example, Carey (2001) finds that internal ratings 
computed by 20 US banks differ in about 55% of the cases, while Jacobson et al. (2003) 
compare internal ratings computed by 2 major Swedish banks and find that they “differ 
widely in quite some cases”.
27 These differences in internal ratings may be due to the 
type of rating system chosen by the banks (i.e. expert- vs. model-based systems) or to 
the time-horizon of the internal ratings (i.e. through-the-cycle vs. point-in-time ratings). 
However, an alternative explanation to these differences may be that banks 
implementing the IRB generally benchmark their assessments against existing external 
ratings. As a consequence, differences of opinion among external raters may cause 
differences of opinion among internal ratings systems and the evidence presented in this 
paper may be of interest to the credit risk departments of banks which choose to adopt 
the internal rating based approach.     
Several caveats apply to the findings of this study. First, the impact of Basel II is 
simulated by focusing on a bank whose balance sheet characteristics match those of an 
“average” bank in its country of origin. Obviously, the results cannot be generalised to 
every bank whose distribution of assets, credit quality etc. do not necessarily correspond 
to those of the “average” bank. Second, this paper uses June 2002 rating data. Since 
credit ratings change over time, the results only imperfectly capture the differences in 
capital requirements that may emerge when Basel II is implemented. Nevertheless, I 
believe that differences comparable to those presented in this paper are likely to exist 
under the new capital adequacy framework, given the evidence on the persistence of 
disagreements between credit rating agencies (cf. Appendix 1). Third, the results are 
only based on a sample of the whole population of credit ratings issued by Moody’s, S&P 
and Fitch. Since this sample is relatively large, I am, however, confident that my results 
                                                           
27 The comparison is not easy to make since the two banks have different internal rating scales. 
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are robust and will hold for other samples of credit ratings. Finally, this paper abstains 
from modelling the impact of risk-mitigation techniques on banks’ regulatory capital. 
Credit-risk mitigants such as collaterals, guarantees and credit derivatives, are used by 
banks to transfer their risk to a third party and to reduce their capital charge in 
accordance with the provisions set by the Basel Committee. In spite of their growing 
importance, risk-mitigation techniques were not considered in the present study. This is 
due to the absence of precise data on the portion of EMU bank loans that are 
collateralised, which prevents me from assigning collaterals randomly to the assets drawn 
in the Monte-Carlo simulations.
28 Note that the Committee (2003a and 2003b) indicates 
that even banks found it difficult to gather data on eligible collaterals, with those 
participating in QIS 3 reporting less than 10% of their total exposures as being secured 
by collateral. As a consequence, the results of this study (as those in QIS 3) probably 





























                                                           
28 This approach would have been similar to the one followed by Derviz et al. (2003). 
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Table 1: Risk-weights for credit risk in Basel II (standardised approach) and in Basel I 








BBB+  BB+ 
  to        to 




Below     Not 
  B-     rated 
           Non- 
OECD  OECD
Corporate  20%  50%  100% 100% 150% 150% 100% 100%  100% 
Option 1 
   20%  50%  100% 100% 100% 150% 100%   
Bank
 a  LT 20% 50% 50%  100% 100% 150% 50% 
 
Option 2  
ST 20% 20% 20% 50% 50%  150% 20% 
LT 
 20%      100% 
ST 
 20%        20%
Sovereign 0%  20%  50%  100%  100%  150%  100%  0%  100% 
Note: 
a The distinction between Option 1 (risk-weight one category below that of the sovereign) and 
Option 2 (risk-weight based on the rating of the bank) applies only in Basel II 





Table 2: Comparison of long-term issuer rating scales between credit rating agencies  
  Credit rating agency 
Credit quality  Moody’s S&P Fitch
  Investment grade 
Highest credit quality     Aaa     AAA     AAA 
High credit quality     Aa1 to Aa3     AA+ to AA-     AA+ to AA- 
Strong payment capacity     A1 to A3     A+ to A-     A+ to A- 
Adequate payment capacity     Baa1 to Baa3     BBB+ to BBB-     BBB+ to BBB- 
  Speculative grade 
Possibility of credit risk     Ba1 to Ba3     BB+ to BB-     BB+ to BB- 
Significant credit risk     B1 to B3     B+ to B-     B+ to B- 
High credit risk     Caa1 to Caa3     CCC+ to CCC-     CCC+ to CCC- 
Default is likely     Ca      CC     CC 
Default is imminent     C     C     C 
In Default     -     D, SD     DDD, DD, D 
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Table 4 (Panel A):  Counterparties jointly rated by two credit rating agencies, A1 and A2 
 (June  2002) 
            
Corporates         
        Risk-weights in Basel II (standardised approach) 
A1 A 2 n  A1 > A2 A 1 = A2 A 1 < A2 
Moody’s S&P  762  (100)  139 (18.2)  591 (77.6)  32  (4.2) 
Moody’s Fitch  175  (100)  24 (13.7)  146 (83.4)  5  (2.9) 
S&P  Fitch 381  (100)  37 (9.7) 327 (85.8) 17  (4.5) 
            
B a n k s          
        Risk-weights in Basel II (standardised approach) 
A1 A 2 n  A1 > A2 A 1 = A2 A 1 < A2 
Moody’s S&P  256  (100)  4 (1.6) 201 (78.5) 51  (19.9) 
Moody’s  Fitch 206  (100)  8 (3.9) 187 (90.8) 11  (5.3) 
S&P Fitch  289  (100)  43 (14.9) 245 (84.8)  1  (0.3) 
            
Sovereigns         
        Risk-weights in Basel II (standardised approach) 
A1 A 2 n  A1 > A2 A 1 = A2 A 1 < A2 
Moody’s S&P  84  (100)  6 (7.1)  73 (86.9)  5  (6.0) 
Moody’s Fitch  71  (100)  6 (8.5)  61 (85.9)  4  (5.6) 
S&P Fitch  69  (100)  5 (7.3)  61 (88.4)  3  (4.3) 
            
Source: Osiris (update 18) and Bankscope (update 143.2)  
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Table 4 (Panel B):  Counterparties rated by at least one credit rating agency, A1 or A2 
 (June  2002) 
            
Corporates         
        Risk-weights in Basel II (standardised approach) 
A1 A 2 n  A1 > A2 A 1 = A2 A 1 < A2 
Moody’s S&P  1966  (100)  532 (27.0)  1258 (64.0)  176  (9.0) 
Moody’s  Fitch 1197  (100)  510 (42.6) 540 (45.1) 147  (12.3) 
S&P Fitch 1898  (100)  371 (19.5)  1163 (61.3) 364  (19.2) 
            
B a n k s          
        Risk-weights in Basel II (standardised approach) 
A1 A 2 n  A1 > A2 A 1 = A2 A 1 < A2 
Moody’s S&P  700  (100)  89 (12.7) 451 (64.4) 160  (22.9) 
Moody’s Fitch  778  (100)  72 (9.2)  524 (67.4)  182  (23.4) 
S&P Fitch  881  (100)  124 (14.1) 596 (67.6) 161  (18.3) 
            
Sovereigns         
        Risk-weights in Basel II (standardised approach) 
A1 A 2 n  A1 > A2 A 1 = A2 A 1 < A2 
Moody’s S&P  101  (100)  10 (9.9)  81 (80.2)  10  (9.9) 
Moody’s Fitch  101  (100)  11 (10.9) 76 (75.2) 14  (13.9) 
S&P Fitch  96  (100)  9 (9.3)  76 (79.2)  11  (11.5) 
            
Note:  unrated corporates and unrated sovereigns receive a 100% risk-weight, unrated banks 
receive a 50% risk-weight  
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Table 5: Distribution of 
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Table 6: Loans to unrated counterpa
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Table  7:  Average regulatory capital per asset class assuming that some bank 




    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate 0.50  0.49 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.48 
Bank  0.44  0.61 0.58 0.59 0.56 0.58 0.55 0.54 
Sovereign 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Total  0.94  1.12 1.07 1.09 1.05 1.07 1.03 1.03 
Minimum 0.90  0.99 0.93 0.98 0.93 0.98 0.93 0.91 
Maximum 1.06  1.39 1.41 1.32 1.22 1.23 1.28 1.19 
Tests of hypothesis never reject H0. 
           
France 
    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate 0.43  0.41 0.38 0.41 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.38 
Bank  0.57  0.82 0.81 0.78 0.79 0.77 0.78 0.77 
Sovereign 0.02  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Total  1.02  1.25 1.21 1.21 1.20 1.19 1.18 1.18 
Minimum 0.98  1.09 1.04 1.08 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.05 
Maximum 1.10  1.56 1.46 1.38 1.37 1.36 1.37 1.37 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing S and F; S+F and M+S+F. 
           
Germany 
    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate 0.46  0.45 0.42 0.46 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.42 
Bank  0.44  0.67 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.66 
Sovereign 0.04  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Total  0.93  1.16 1.14 1.17 1.13 1.14 1.12 1.12 
Minimum 0.91  1.04 1.00 1.11 1.00 1.04 1.01 1.00 
Maximum 0.99  1.33 1.30 1.31 1.30 1.31 1.29 1.30 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing S and M+F. 




a “Minimum” and “Maximum” refer to the lowest and highest values taken by total 
capital requirements. The null hypothesis (H0) is that the distributions of total capital 
requirements have the same mean; M = Moody’s, S = S&P, F = Fitch. 
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Table  7ctd:  Average regulatory capital per asset class assuming that some bank 




    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate  0.76  0.75 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.73 
Bank  0.45 0.63 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.58 
Sovereign  0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Total  1.34 1.52 1.49 1.47 1.48 1.46 1.45 1.45 
Minimum   1.29 1.32 1.31 1.33 1.32 1.29 1.31 1.32 
Maximum  1.46 1.86 1.89 1.67 1.67 1.66 1.65 1.64 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing F and M+S; M+F and S+F. 
          
Luxembourg 
    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate  0.79 0.78 0.74 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.74 
Bank  0.85 1.17 1.19 1.14 1.15 1.12 1.15 1.12 
Sovereign  0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Total  1.68 1.98 1.96 1.94 1.94 1.91 1.92 1.90 
Minimum   1.61 1.75 1.72 1.71 1.70 1.68 1.69 1.69 
Maximum  1.83 2.34 2.35 2.24 2.26 2.25 2.24 2.25 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing F and M+S; M+F and S+F. 
          
Netherlands 
    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate  0.52 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.51 
Bank  0.52 0.69 0.71 0.69 0.69 0.67 0.68 0.67 
Sovereign  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Total  1.07 1.23 1.24 1.23 1.22 1.21 1.20 1.20 
Minimum   1.01 1.08 1.07 1.11 1.07 1.09 1.06 1.06 
Maximum  1.20 1.56 1.58 1.39 1.41 1.39 1.37 1.36 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing M+F and S+F. 




a “Minimum” and “Maximum” refer to the lowest and highest values taken by total 
capital requirements. The null hypothesis (H0) is that the distributions of total capital 
requirements have the same mean; M = Moody’s, S = S&P, F = Fitch. 
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Table  7ctd:  Average regulatory capital per asset class assuming that some bank 




    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate  0.59 0.57 0.45 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.45 
Bank  0.33 0.48 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.45 
Sovereign  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Total  0.93 1.06 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.91 
Minimum  0.91 0.98 0.82 0.80 0.84 0.81 0.79 0.79 
Maximum  0.97 1.20 1.09 1.13 1.09 1.12 1.09 1.09 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing Basel I and S; Basel I and F; S and F; 
S and M+S; F and M+S; M+S and M+F; S+F and M+S+F.  
          
EMU average 
    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate  0.58 0.57 0.53 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.53 
Bank  0.51 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.68 
Sovereign  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Total  1.13 1.33 1.29 1.29 1.28 1.27 1.26 1.25 
Minimum   1.10 1.27 1.21 1.24 1.22 1.22 1.20 1.20 
Maximum  1.18 1.41 1.37 1.35 1.33 1.33 1.31 1.30 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing S and F. 




a “Minimum” and “Maximum” refer to the lowest and highest values taken by total 
capital requirements. The null hypothesis (H0) is that the distributions of total capital 
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Table  8:  Average regulatory capital per asset class assuming that all bank 




    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate 0.50  0.50 0.38 0.49 0.39 0.50 0.38 0.39 
Bank  0.44  0.61 0.58 0.59 0.55 0.57 0.54 0.53 
Sovereign 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Total  0.94  1.12 0.97 1.09 0.95 1.08 0.93 0.93 
Minimum 0.90  0.94 0.78 0.94 0.76 0.92 0.76 0.76 
Maximum 1.06  1.48 1.33 1.28 1.15 1.29 1.12 1.12 
Tests of hypothesis never reject H0. 
           
France 
    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate  0.43  0.42 0.35 0.42 0.36 0.41 0.35 0.36 
Bank  0.57  0.83 0.80 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.76 
Sovereign 0.02  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Total  1.02  1.27 1.17 1.21 1.16 1.20 1.14 1.14 
Minimum 0.98  1.03 0.90 1.02 0.90 1.00 0.88 0.89 
Maximum 1.10  1.61 1.53 1.50 1.47 1.41 1.47 1.46 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing S+F and M+S+F. 
           
Germany 
    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate  0.46  0.45 0.42 0.46 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.42 
Bank  0.44  0.61 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.62 0.60 
Sovereign 0.04  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Total  0.93  1.10 1.09 1.11 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.05 
Minimum 0.91  0.91 0.91 0.99 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.88 
Maximum 0.99  1.31 1.31 1.35 1.26 1.29 1.29 1.27 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing M+S and S+F. 




a “Minimum” and “Maximum” refer to the lowest and highest values taken by total 
capital requirements. The null hypothesis (H0) is that the distributions of total capital 
requirements have the same mean; M = Moody’s, S = S&P, F = Fitch. 
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Table  8ctd:  Average regulatory capital per asset class assuming that all bank 




    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate 0.76  0.73 0.69 0.68 0.70 0.67 0.69 0.70 
Bank  0.45  0.62 0.64 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.59 0.57 
Sovereign 0.13  0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Total  1.34  1.47 1.44 1.40 1.41 1.36 1.39 1.37 
Minimum 1.29  1.19 1.20 1.17 1.16 1.11 1.15 1.16 
Maximum 1.46  1.83 1.84 1.66 1.70 1.60 1.66 1.65 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing F and S+F. 
           
Luxembourg 
    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate 0.79  0.75 0.65 0.72 0.67 0.70 0.65 0.66 
Bank  0.85  1.12 1.15 1.10 1.09 1.05 1.10 1.05 
Sovereign 0.03  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Total  1.68  1.90 1.83 1.86 1.79 1.78 1.78 1.74 
Minimum 1.61  1.57 1.44 1.48 1.42 1.45 1.43 1.35 
Maximum 1.83  2.38 2.39 2.27 2.17 2.14 2.16 2.11 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing M+S and M+F; M+F and S+F. 
           
Netherlands 
    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate 0.52  0.50 0.47 0.51 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.47 
Bank  0.52  0.70 0.71 0.68 0.69 0.67 0.67 0.66 
Sovereign 0.02  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Total  1.07  1.21 1.21 1.21 1.18 1.17 1.16 1.16 
Minimum 1.01  0.96 0.99 1.03 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.96 
Maximum 1.20  1.59 1.64 1.46 1.51 1.39 1.41 1.46 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing M and S; M and F; S and F. 




a “Minimum” and “Maximum” refer to the lowest and highest values taken by total 
capital requirements. The null hypothesis (H0) is that the distributions of total capital 
requirements have the same mean; M = Moody’s, S = S&P, F = Fitch. 
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Table  8ctd:  Average regulatory capital per asset class assuming that all bank 




    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate 0.50  0.57 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.43 0.40 0.40 
Bank  0.44  0.48 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.45 
Sovereign 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Total  0.94  1.06 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.86 0.86 
Minimum 0.90  0.92 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.73 0.73 
Maximum 1.06  1.21 1.10 1.10 1.07 1.09 1.06 1.06 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing S and F; S and M+S; F and M+S; 
M+S and M+F; S+F and M+S+F. 
           
EMU average 
    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate 0.58  0.56 0.48 0.53 0.49 0.52 0.48 0.49 
Bank  0.51  0.71 0.71 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.66 
Sovereign 0.04  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Total  1.13  1.30 1.23 1.25 1.21 1.22 1.19 1.18 
Minimum 1.10  1.21 1.13 1.17 1.12 1.14 1.11 1.10 
Maximum  1.18  1.40 1.36 1.35 1.31 1.31 1.30 1.28 
Tests of hypothesis never reject H0. 
           
Notes: 
a “Minimum” and “Maximum” refer to the lowest and highest values taken by total 
capital requirements. The null hypothesis (H0) is that the distributions of total capital 
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Table  9:  Average regulatory capital per asset class assuming that banks engage in 




    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate  0.50  0.50 0.36 0.49 0.38 0.50 0.37 0.38 
Bank  0.43  0.61 0.53 0.59 0.53 0.59 0.54 0.54 
Sovereign 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Total  0.93  1.12 0.90 1.09 0.92 1.09 0.91 0.92 
Minimum 0.90  0.97 0.74 0.95 0.76 0.96 0.74 0.76 
Maximum 1.06  1.45 1.11 1.35 1.12 1.37 1.12 1.13 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing F and M+F; M+S and M+S+F. 
           
France 
    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate  0.43  0.41 0.34 0.42 0.35 0.41 0.35 0.35 
Bank  0.57  0.82 0.75 0.79 0.75 0.78 0.75 0.75 
Sovereign 0.02  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Total  1.02  1.25 1.11 1.22 1.12 1.21 1.11 1.12 
Minimum 0.98  1.04 0.87 1.03 0.87 0.99 0.88 0.88 
Maximum 1.10  1.58 1.37 1.46 1.38 1.46 1.37 1.38 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing S and S+F; M+S and M+S+F.  
           
Germany 
    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate  0.46  0.45 0.40 0.46 0.41 0.45 0.40 0.41 
Bank  0.44  0.63 0.60 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.61 
Sovereign 0.04  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Total  0.93  1.11 1.04 1.11 1.05 1.10 1.04 1.05 
Minimum 0.91  0.96 0.91 1.03 0.92 0.96 0.91 0.91 
Maximum 0.99  1.34 1.25 1.30 1.26 1.30 1.26 1.26 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing M and F; M+S and M+S+F.  




a “Minimum” and “Maximum” refer to the lowest and highest values taken by total 
capital requirements. The null hypothesis (H0) is that the distributions of total capital 
requirements have the same mean; M = Moody’s, S = S&P, F = Fitch. 
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Table 9ctd:  Average regulatory capital per asset class assuming that banks engage in 




    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate  0.76  0.74 0.67 0.74 0.68 0.72 0.67 0.68 
Bank  0.45  0.63 0.58 0.60 0.58 0.60 0.58 0.58 
Sovereign 0.13  0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 
Total  1.34  1.48 1.35 1.46 1.37 1.44 1.36 1.37 
Minimum 1.29  1.24 1.14 1.24 1.15 1.21 1.15 1.15 
Maximum 1.46  1.92 1.55 1.72 1.59 1.71 1.58 1.60 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing M+S and M+S+F. 
           
Luxembourg 
    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate  0.79  0.75 0.62 0.74 0.65 0.71 0.63 0.64 
Bank  0.85  1.14 1.06 1.11 1.06 1.08 1.06 1.06 
Sovereign 0.03  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Total  1.68  1.92 1.71 1.88 1.74 1.83 1.72 1.74 
Minimum 1.61  1.58 1.40 1.56 1.46 1.55 1.45 1.46 
Maximum 1.83  2.36 2.00 2.23 2.04 2.13 2.02 2.05 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing S and S+F; M+S and M+S+F. 
           
Netherlands 
    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II  
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate  0.52  0.50 0.45 0.52 0.47 0.49 0.45 0.47 
Bank  0.52  0.70 0.65 0.68 0.65 0.67 0.65 0.66 
Sovereign 0.02  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Total  1.07  1.21 1.11 1.21 1.14 1.18 1.12 1.14 
Minimum 1.01  1.01 0.93 1.06 0.95 0.98 0.93 0.95 
Maximum 1.20  1.61 1.32 1.45 1.35 1.41 1.33 1.35 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing M and F; M+S and M+S+F. 




a “Minimum” and “Maximum” refer to the lowest and highest values taken by total 
capital requirements. The null hypothesis (H0) is that the distributions of total capital 
requirements have the same mean; M = Moody’s, S = S&P, F = Fitch. 
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Table 9ctd:  Average regulatory capital per asset class assuming that banks engage in 




    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II 
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate 0.59  0.57 0.40 0.46 0.41 0.44 0.40 0.41 
Bank  0.33  0.48 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.45 
Sovereign 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Total  0.93  1.06 0.86 0.93 0.86 0.91 0.86 0.87 
Minimum 0.91  0.96 0.72 0.76 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.72 
Maximum 0.97  1.26 1.06 1.14 1.09 1.12 1.06 1.09 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing Basel I and F; M+S and S+F; M+S 
and M+S+F. 
           
EMU average 
    External credit assessment institution(s) chosen in Basel II 
Portfolio   Basel I  M  S  F  M+S  M+F    S+F    M+S+F  
Corporate  0.58  0.56 0.46 0.55 0.48 0.53 0.47 0.48 
Bank  0.51  0.71 0.66 0.69 0.66 0.69 0.66 0.66 
Sovereign 0.04  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Total  1.13  1.31 1.15 1.27 1.17 1.25 1.16 1.17 
Minimum  1.10  1.17 1.02 1.11 1.03 1.09 1.04 0.03 
Maximum  1.18  1.55 1.35 1.47 1.36 1.42 1.35 1.36 
Tests of hypothesis do not reject H0 when comparing M+S and M+S+F. 




a “Minimum” and “Maximum” refer to the lowest and highest values taken by total 
capital requirements. The null hypothesis (H0) is that the distributions of total capital 
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Appendix 1:  
 
Distribution of risk-weights in Basel II, 1996-2004 (jointly rated 




b         
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
M > S  19.5  18.4  20.5  21.8 
M = S  77.6  77.7  76.7  75.5 
M < S  2.9  3.9  2.8  2.7 
n 
... ... ... ... ... 
487 746 776 848 
M > F  19.7  12.8  13.4  12.9 
M = F  75.8  84.1  81.4  82.8 
M < F  4.5  3.0  5.2  4.3 
n 
... ... ... ... ... 
66  164 172 209 
S > F  14.7  10.4  6.7  6.5 
S = F  81.4  84.1  87.0  88.8 
S < F  4.0  5.5  6.3  4.7 
n 
... ... ... ... ... 
177 365 415 509 
 
Banks 
c           
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
M  >  S  1.9 2.9 8.8 6.1 5.3 6.0 2.8 1.6 0.4 
M  =  S  82.9 82.6 76.9 86.6 81.9 71.9 77.6 75.3 78.9 
M  <  S  15.2 14.5 14.3  7.3  12.8 22.1 19.7 23.1 20.7 
n  210 207 238 164 243 235 254 251 261 
M  >  F  16.9 14.4 13.8 10.5 11.4 11.0  7.1  1.8  0.4 
M  =  F  76.8 83.0 84.2 88.3 87.6 76.1 83.3 91.0 90.7 
M  <  F  6.3 2.6 2.0 1.2 1.0  12.9  9.5 7.2 8.9 
n  142 153 152 162 193 209 210 221 247 
S  >  F 20.8 20.4 17.1 15.3 19.0 14.5 14.1 16.3 16.4 
S  =  F 75.4 78.9 82.3 84.0 80.6 85.2 85.2 82.7 81.6 
S  <  F  3.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.9 
n  130 147 175 150 242 297 284 313 359 
 
Notes: 
a As of end-January; M = Moody’s, S = S&P, F = Fitch 
 
b Osiris did not exist before 2001 
 
c S&P rating information for 1999 (as mentioned on Bankscope) subject to omissions 
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